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Maresa A. Jenson 
 
Overturning thirty-year-old precedent, Cottonwood Environmental Law 
Center v. United States Forest Service held that merely proving a procedural 
violation of the ESA is no longer enough to show irreparable injury in support of 
injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Cottonwood, 
concluding the Forest Service violated the ESA by not reinitiating consultation, 
but declined to provide injunctive relief because Cottonwood failed to show 
irreparable injury to the Canadian lynx.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary issue in Cottonwood Environmental Law Center v. United 
States Forest Service was whether injunctive relief should be provided for a 
procedural violation of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) by the United States 
Forest Service (“Forest Service”) concerning the Canadian lynx.1 Two Supreme 
Court of the United States cases have held that injunctive relief is not necessary 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).2 Here, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled these NEPA decisions overruled 
Thomas v. Peterson, 3  which held that procedural violations of the ESA are 
presumed to have caused irreparable harm. 4  While the Forest Service 
procedurally violated ESA consultation requirements, the court determined 
Cottonwood Environmental Law Center (“Cottonwood”) failed to show 
irreparable harm.5 Therefore, as the law now stands, the court was unable to 
provide the relief requested.  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) listed a distinct 
population of the Canada lynx as a threatened species under the ESA in 2000.6 
The FWS then designated the Canadian lynx’s critical habitat in 2006.7 At that 
                                                        
1 Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
2 Id. at 1092; see Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010). 
3  Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985). 
4 Cottonwood, 789 F.2d at 1092 (discussing Thomas, 735 F.2d 754). 
5  Id.  
6 Id. at 1077; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012); Endangered and Threatened 
Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distinct 
Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 65 Fed. Reg. 16052, 16061 (Mar. 24, 2000). 
7 Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1077-78; see Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and 
Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distinct Population 
Segment of the Canada Lynx, 71 Fed. Reg. 66008, 66030 (Nov. 9, 2006).  
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time, the critical habitat did not include any Forest Service land within the 
Northern Rocky Mountains.8 Relying on the 2006 critical habitat designation, the 
Forest Service implemented the Northern Rocky Mountains Lynx Management 
Direction (“Lynx Amendments”). 9  The Lynx Amendments provided specific 
guidelines for multi-use permits with the possibility of affecting Canadian lynx 
habitat.10 In March 2007, the FWS determined the Lynx Amendments’ land and 
activity management policies did not jeopardize the Canadian lynx. 11  This 
determination was released in a FWS biological opinion (“BiOp”) following 
consultation under Section 7 of the ESA.12 Shortly after, in June 2007, the FWS 
announced the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior had “improperly 
influenced” the critical habitat designation.13 Subsequently, in 2009, the FWS 
revised the Canadian lynx’s critical habitat to include eleven National Forests 
and a territory of 39,000 square mile—previously 1,841 square miles.14 Over 
10,000 square miles of designated critical habitat are located in the Northern 
Rocky Mountains unit.15  
Despite the addition of designated critical habitat on Forest Service 
lands, the Forest Service failed to reinitiate consultation on the Lynx 
Amendments under Section 7. 16  The Forest Service relied on the Lynx 
Amendments in FWS BiOps for two projects in the Northern Rocky Mountains 
unit’s Gallatin Forest and determined the projects were considered “unlikely to 
modify or adversely affect the Canadian lynx’s critical habitat.”17  
Cottonwood filed this action in 2012 seeking injunctive relief for the 
Forest Service’s procedural violation of the ESA when it failed to reinitiate 
Section 7 consultation.18  The United States District Court for the District of 
Montana granted Cottonwood summary judgment without issuing its requested 
remedy of an injunction.19 Both parties appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reviewed 
the district court’s order de novo.20  
                                                        
8 Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1078. 
9  Id.  
10  Id. 
11  Id.; see An Act to Provide for the Conservation of Endangered and Threatened 
Species of Fish, Wildlife, and Plants, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884 
(1973), codified at, 16 U.S.C. § 1536. 
12 Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1078; see Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and 
Plants; Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distance 
Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 74 Fed. Reg. 8616, 8618 (Feb. 25, 2009).  
13 Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1078. 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1078-79; see Salix v. U.S. Forest Serv., 944 F. Supp. 2d 984 (D. Mont. 
2013), aff’d sub nom., Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075. 
19  Salix, 944 S. Supp. at 1002-03. 
20  Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1079. 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Cottonwood as well 
as the district court’s denial of injunctive relief.21 Even so, Cottonwood was not 
penalized for relying on the previous precedent of thirty years.22 The case was 
remanded to the district court, where Cottonwood may still prove irreparable 
harm to the Canadian lynx and possibly obtain its requested injunction.23 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Ninth Circuit explored four issues on appeal. The court revisited and 
affirmed Cottonwood had standing,24 the issue was ripe for review,25 and the 
Forest Service had violated the ESA.26 The court also reviewed the denial of 
injunctive relief for abuse of discretion.27 Finding no abuse, the court affirmed 
the denial of injunctive relief. 28  This case summary does not discuss the 
straightforward standing and ripeness issues. The ESA violation will be explored 
briefly with the focus of the narrative on the truly precedential issue in this 
holdingthe denial of injunctive relief along with Judge Pregerson’s dissent. 
 
A.  Procedural Violation: A Failure to Reinitiate Consultation Under the ESA 
 
The court determined when additional land was designated as critical 
habitat for the Canadian lynx in 2009, the Forest Service had violated the ESA by 
failing to reinitiate consultation on the additional habitat.29 Section 7(a)(2) of the 
ESA stipulates: 
  
[a] [f]ederal agency shall . . . insure [sic] that any action 
authorized, funded or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely 
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species 
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of [the critical] habitat of such species.30 
  
If an action may affect a critical habitat, a BiOp must be produced in order to 
determine if the action should be permitted.31  
Both parties agree the 2007 BiOp satisfied the Forest Service’s 
obligation to comply with ESA Section 7 consultation.32 The violation occurred 
                                                        
21 Id. at 1092. 
22  Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 1079-83. 
25  Id. at 1083-84. 
26  Id. at 1084-88. 
27  Id. at 1089-91. 
28  Id. at 1088-92. 
29 Id. at 1084-85. 
30 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).  
31 Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1085. 
32 Id. 
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when the critical habitat was revised in 2009 and the Forest Service failed to 
reinitiate the required formal consultation.33 The Forest Service argued that the 
Lynx Amendments were already incorporated into forest management so the 
NEPA standards of review applied and no need existed to reinitiate 
consultation. 34  The court determined the argument was flawed because the 
language of the ESA was clearly written to develop its own requirement to 
reinitiate consultation when an agency is presented with new information about 
an endangered or threatened species. 35  The court clearly asserted “new 
protections triggered new obligations. The Forest Service cannot evade its 
obligations by relying on an analysis it completed before the protections were put 
in place.”36  
 
B.  Injunctive Relief: Procedural Violations Require Irreparable Harm 
 
Cottonwood argued the Ninth Circuit should reverse the district court’s 
denial of injunctive relief and follow its previous holding in Thomas. 37  In 
Thomas, the Ninth Circuit had “long recognized an exception to the traditional 
test for injunctive relief when addressing procedural violations under the ESA.”38 
The traditional test for injunctive relief has four parts, the first of which requires 
proof of irreparable harm.39 Thomas removed the burden to prove irreparable 
harm if there was a procedural violation.40  
Thomas held an injunction was an appropriate remedy based on “[t]he 
procedural requirements of the ESA [being] analogous to those of NEPA” and 
that “[i]rreparable damage is presumed to flow from a failure to properly 
evaluate.”41  In Cottonwood, the court considered the assertion there was “no 
reason” the procedural exception for injunctive relief applicable to NEPA claims 
“should not apply to procedural violations of the ESA,” a “critical” element of 
the Thomas holding.42  
 The Forest Service argued that Thomas has been overruled by two 
Supreme Court cases that dispensed with the procedural exception to NEPA.43 
One of these cases went so far as to consider injunction an inappropriate form of 
                                                        
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1085-86; see Reinitiating of Formal Consultation 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 
(2015). 
36 Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1086. 
37  Id. at 1088. 
38 Id. (discussing Thomas, 753 F.2d at 764.) 
39 Id. 
40  Thomas, 753 F.2d at 764. 
41 Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1088-89; see Thomas, 753 F.2d at 764 (citing Save 
Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 1984); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
42 Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1089. 
43 Id.; see Winter, 555 U.S. 7 (increasing the burden to show irreparable harm 
from likely to a possibility); Monsanto, 561 U.S. 139 (making injunction a remedy only if 
irreparable harm is shown in the traditional four-factor test). 
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relief except in “unusual circumstances,” because “there is nothing in NEPA that 
allows courts considering injunctive relief to put their ‘thumb on the scales.’”44 
The court also considered whether the ESA and the NEPA were different 
enough as to make them incomparable.45 The court analyzed whether Congress 
spoke on this issue and whether the Supreme Court interpreted the level of 
discretion courts are afforded.46 The Ninth Circuit determined nothing in the ESA 
inferred or explicitly gave guidance on a court’s discretion to find irreparable 
injury.47 It was in this context the Ninth Circuit denied injunctive relief, relying 
on current NEPA holdings—the same manner in which the precedent in Thomas 
was established.48  
 
C.  United States Circuit Judge Harry Pregerson’s and Dissenting Opinion 
 
Circuit Judge Pregerson believed the majority inappropriately denied 
injunctive relief.49 Judge Pregerson did not believe Thomas was overruled by the 
change in the NEPA’s interpretation. 50  Instead, Judge Pregerson thought the 
majority “fail[ed] to appreciate the critical difference between [the NEPA and the 
ESA].” 51  Judge Pregerson asserted the purpose of the NEPA is procedural, 
whereas the purpose of the ESA is to protect threatened and endangered 
species.52 Judge Pregerson was concerned with the practical application of the 
court’s holding in future litigation.53 Judge Pregerson questioned whether district 
courts would be able to properly pass judgment on irreparable harm.54  
Judge Pregerson also worried the majority did not consider the scientific 
work required to make a determination of irreparable harm, stating “[i]t is 
important to note that the majority opinion eliminates Thomas’ procedural 
protections as a global storm of extinction rages.” 55  On this issue, Judge 
Pregerson’s dissent is directly confronted in the majority opinion, which quotes 
his charged language. 56  While the majority found its holding easily 
understandable and aligned with the objectives of the ESA,57 the dissent believed 
                                                        
44 Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1089; see Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 157. 
45  Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1089-91. 
46 Id. at 1089-90. 
47 Id. at 1090; see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 
(1987). 
48 Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1091. 
49  Id. at 1092-95 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
50 Id. at 1093. 
51  Id. 
52 Id. 
53  Id. at 1094-95. 
54 Id. at 1093. 
55 Id. at 1094. 
56 Id. at 1091 (majority opinion). 
57 Id. at 1092. 
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the majority did not follow Congress’s directive to “afford . . . endangered 
species the highest of priority.”58 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
This case is significant as it overturns Thomas and increases the burden 
of proof for those attempting to enforce procedural violations of the ESA. 
Despite the Forest Service’s clear violation of the ESA, by failing to reinitiate 
Section 7 consultation, the court refused to apply an injunction without proof of 
irreparable harm. The dissent worried that in practice, showing irreparable harm 
will prove onerous. As Cottonwood stands, in order to obtain an injunction within 
the Ninth Circuit based on procedural violations of the ESA, the burden to show 
irreparable harm rests on those prosecuting ESA claims. 
                                                        
58  Id. at 1093 (Pregerson, J., dissenting); see Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 
1383 (9th Cir. 1987). 
